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Abstract: The generation of certifiable randomness is one of the most promising applications of
quantum technologies. Furthermore, the intrinsic non-locality of quantum correlations allow us to
certify randomness in a device-independent way, i.e., we do not need to make assumptions about the
devices used. Due to the work of Curchod et al. a single entangled two-qubit pure state can be used
to produce arbitrary amounts of certified randomness. However, the obtaining of this randomness
is experimentally challenging as it requires a large number of measurements, both projective and
general. Motivated by these difficulties in the device-independent setting, we instead consider the
scenario of one-sided device independence where certain devices are trusted, and others are not;
a scenario motivated by asymmetric experimental set-ups such as ion-photon networks. We show
how certain aspects of previous works can be adapted to this scenario and provide theoretical bounds
on the amount of randomness that can be certified. Furthermore, we give a protocol for unbounded
randomness certification in this scenario, and provide numerical results demonstrating the protocol in
the ideal case. Finally, we numerically test the possibility of implementing this scheme on near-term
quantum technologies, by considering the performance of the protocol on several physical platforms.
Keywords: one-sided device independence; randomness generation; randomness certification;
quantum cryptography; semi-definite programming; self testing
1. Introduction
Quantum physics has the potential to make a great impact upon information technology, especially
through the development of universal quantum computers. However, near-term quantum devices will
not be capable of fault-tolerant, universal quantum computation. Luckily these devices will still be of
use for information processing tasks, in particular as genuine random number generators. Certifiable
(private) random numbers can then be used for cryptography, the simulation of physical systems,
or other randomised algorithms. By certifiable we mean that there is a certificate guaranteeing that
the randomness is private and unpredictable from any external agent (who is not directly using the
device). This certificate may be predicated on certain assumptions, which could be computational or
physical in nature, depending on the degree of security desired.
It is now well established that quantum systems are capable of producing data that is
unpredictable, and thus random to any external agent, even when one has perfect knowledge of the
quantum system. Unfortunately, in practice it can be difficult to have perfect knowledge of quantum
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systems, especially if they are somewhat noisy, as near-term quantum devices will be. These (often
classical) sources of noise can appear as unpredictable as the randomness resulting from the quantum
systems, so one must have an excellent characterisation of the sources of noise to extract the true
quantum randomness. Indeed, if the noise is just classical data then it could have been generated by
some external process and thus an external agent could, in principle, keep a copy of this data and use
it to predict the output data of a quantum device.
There does exist a convenient approach to certifiable quantum random number generation,
which is device-independent randomness certification. In this scenario one does not need a complete
characterisation of a device; genuine randomness is certified by the violation of a Bell inequality [1]
between two, or more, devices. That is, certification is achieved via the statistics produced in a Bell test,
without any specific assumptions made on the devices producing the statistics.The kind of assumption
made in this approach is to assume that devices are quantum mechanical or that there multiple,
non-communicating devices that might share some resource. Furthermore, there are no computational
assumptions made about the device producing the randomness. The downside of this approach is
that a genuine violation of a Bell inequality is experimentally daunting, with the first loophole-free
demonstrations emerging very recently [2].
Given the experimental challenges of device-independent random number generation, [3,4] a
promising and practical route to certifiable randomness generation is within the scope of one-sided
device-independent quantum information [5]. In this setting, certain devices are assumed to be
perfectly characterised (through trusted and characterised measurement devices) while others are not.
Randomness can be certified based on the violation of a steering inequality [6], which is the analogue
of a Bell inequality for this new setting.
Within the framework of device-independent randomness certification it was shown that a single
entangled pair of qubits (in a pure state) can be a source of “unbounded" random numbers, one qubit
for each wing of the Bell experiment [7]. That is, one can fix a value N of random bits that one would
like to obtain, and then construct a scheme with sequences of measurements on the two-qubit state
that will produce N bits of randomness. Thus by using a sequence of measurements, one can exceed
the randomness possible from a single general measurement, which for a qubit is 2 bits [8]. One issue
is that this randomness certification scheme involves a large number of measurements (exponential in
the size of the output random string) for one of the parties and limits its utility for various protocols.
In this work, we study the adaptation of the above sequential measurement scenario to the
one-sided device independent scenario. In doing so, we develop a more robust scheme no longer
requiring exponentially many measurements for one of the parties. We present an analytical bound on
the min entropy of our randomness generation scheme. We then go on to give numerical results to
derive more optimal rates of randomness generation. Furthermore, we discuss how the scheme could
be implemented in current architectures for networked quantum information processing. This is an
extended version of the following conference paper [9].
Related Work
In Table 1 we compare our work with that of [7], showing how, by trusting one party’s
measurements, we exponentially reduce the number of measurements required. In work by Skrzypczyk
and Cavalcanti, it was shown how, by increasing the local Hilbert space dimension of the quantum
state held by Alice and Bob, more randomness can be certified in the one-sided device-independent
scenario [10]. In particular, for a local dimension d, then Ω(log d) bits can be certified. This work
is built on a series of works in one-sided device-independent randomness certification, with [11]
establishing tools based on semi-definite programming.
Our cryptographic scenario is intermediate between the device-independent and the
device-dependent scenarios. Another such example of an intermediate scenario is that of
semi-device-independent quantum information [12,13], where one bounds the dimension (or energy)
of the Hilbert space of the systems involved. Randomness certification has been shown in this scenario,
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with experimental implementations of various protocols [14,15]. This scenario is not comparable with
that of one-sided device-independence due to the different assumptions, but it demonstrates that such
intermediate scenarios are of broad interest.
Table 1. Comparison between the device-independent and one-sided device-independent sequential
randomness generation between our work and the work in [7]. The positive integer n is the number
of measurements made in a sequence of measurements. Here we see that there is an exponential
improvement in the number of measurements required.
Our Work [7]
Alice Trusted Untrusted
Bob Untrusted Untrusted
Randomness certified Ω(n) Ω(n)
Number of measurements required O(n) O(2n)
Method Steering inequality violation Bell inequality violation
Relevant Quantity Steerable assemblage Non-local probability distribution
{σ~b|~y} {P(a~b|x~y)}
2. One-Sided Device Independence and Randomness Certification
Before introducing the scenario it is worthwhile briefly motivating it first from an experimental
point-of-view. One particular kind of experimental set-up we have in mind is an atom-photon hybrid
experiment, where one system is an atom in a cavity, and the other system is a photon, which is emitted
from the atom. Instead of an atom in a cavity, an ion in a trap is another possibility. Photons are
convenient for long-range communication, and ion trap technology is associated with high fidelity
operations and excellent system control. As a result the detection efficiency in an ion trap is very close
to perfect, but in spite of recent advances, photo-detectors are not. In a device-independent scheme,
a lower detection efficiency can compromise the security of a protocol, so to circumvent these issues
we can resort to the one-sided device-independent setting (1sDI). In this setting, the photonic system
is taken to be trusted and well characterised thus ruling out detector-based attacks, and the atomic
system is treated as a black box.
An extra motivation for this 1sDI scenario will be when one wants to consider sequences of
measurements on the same system, as we will do. We need our technology to allow for the possibility of
returning a quantum system after a measurement (thus being a non-trivial quantum instrument). This is
experimentally challenging for photonic systems, but feasible within ion trap technology. Ideally we
would thus like our trusted system to make very simple operations, such as a single measurement that
does not return a quantum state as an output. In this way, we can see one-sided device independence
as exploiting the best features of a hybrid quantum information experiment. This will be pertinent
when we come to discuss implementations of our randomness certification scheme.
The idea of producing certifiable randomness using steering was first studied by Law et al. [16],
and then by Passaro et al. [11], who utilised the techniques of semi-definite programming. The broad
scenario considered in 1sDI information processing for randomness generation is the following.
There are two parties, Alice (A), and Bob (B), who can share some resource. We allow for the possibility
of a third party, Eve (E), having prepared the shared quantum resource. Alice’s share of the resource is
assumed to be a quantum system with a known Hilbert space, upon which Alice can perform arbitrary
(characterised) quantum operations. In particular, Alice can perform tomographically complete
measurements. Bob’s share of the resource is contained within a black box and he can only input
classical data into the box and retrieve more classical data; he does not have any knowledge of the
inner workings of the black box, only that it has a quantum description. Bob can only collect statistics
of the input and output data.
Given this scenario, the way in which we certify the randomness generated is through a (slightly
modified) non-local guessing game [11,17]. We give a schematic of this guessing game in Figure 1.
In this game, in each round, Eve prepares a quantum state |ψ〉ABE, which we can assume to be pure
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through the Stinespring dilation (we could dilate the Hilbert spaces of Bob and Eve, for example).
Then one subsystem is each distributed to Alice and Bob so that they share the joint state ρAB =
trE|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE. Since Alice has access to her respective subsystem she is able to characterise ρA = BρAB,
but Bob does not have direct access to his subsystem. Inside Bob’s device if he inputs the classical
variable y, which is his choice of measurement, and gets the output b then a measurement is made
on Bob’s subsystem, which is described by the positive operator MBb|y such that ∑b M
B
b|y = IB for all y.
Eve will then in each round perform a measurement that will generate an outcome z, which will be
her guess of Bob’s outcome b; this measurement will be described by a positive operator NEz such that
∑z NEz = IE.
A
B⇢ AB
E
E
Tomographically complete measurement
Eve’s guess
Figure 1. Illustration of the tripartite scenario between Alice, Bob, and Eve, in which Bob also makes a
sequence of measurements and Alice can make trusted measurements. Eve tries to guess the outcomes
of Bob’s measurements.
In this setting, Eve’s goal is to optimise over the state |ψ〉ABE and measurements NEz that will give
her the best chance to guess the outcome of Bob’s measurement. Importantly, Eve’s strategy has to be
compatible with the observed statistics of what Alice and Bob observe. Note that in this game, the most
compact way of describing what Alice and Bob observe (assuming Alice performs tomography on her
system) is described by the assemblage {σb|y}b,y, which is a set where each element can be described as
σb|y = trB
(
IA ⊗MBb|yρAB
)
, (1)
which can be viewed as a sub-normalised density matrix describing the state of Alice’s system after
the measurement MBb|y is made such that ∑b σb|y = ρA for all y. This assemblage is merely Alice’s and
Bob’s observed assemblage, but really every element is obtained in the following way:
σb|y = trBE
(
∑
z
IA ⊗MBb|y ⊗ NEz |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE
)
(2)
= ∑
z
σz,b|y (3)
where we have course-grained over all of Eve’s measurement outcomes, or guesses, and introduced
the identity
σz,b|y = trBE
(
IA ⊗MBb|y ⊗ NEz |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE
)
, (4)
which can be seen as the sub-normalised state of Alice’s system conditioned on Bob’s and Eve’s
particular measurement outcomes.
Returning to the game, we quantify Eve’s ability to guess Bob’s outcome with the guessing
probability. We first assume that that Bob will aim to generate randomness from only one particular
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input, denoted by y∗, and Eve knows y∗. The guessing probability for Eve’s output z to correctly guess
Bob’s output b for choice y∗ is then
pguess(y∗) =∑
z
δb,ztrAσz,b|y∗ . (5)
This can be seen as the sum over z of the probabilities p(z, b|y∗) when b = z [11].
We will now expand upon this set-up to allow for Bob’s measurement to be a sequence of
measurements. That is, we describe Bob’s input y and output b to be tuples of length n, so that
y : = (y1, y2, y3, ..., yn) and b : = (b1, b2, b3, ..., bn). That is, Bob makes a sequence of measurements
where each ith measurement in the sequence corresponds to the measurement choice yi with output bi.
We assume that the output bi is obtained before the choice yi+1 is made, and thus we impose a constraint
of causality: Measurement outcomes in the past are independent of future measurement choices.
A consequence of this, for example, is that p(b1|y1, y2) = p(b1|y1), i.e., the probability of observing b1
given y1 is independent of the future choice of y2. Since trAσb|y = p(b|y) for y : = (y1, y2, y3, ..., yn)
and b : = (b1, b2, b3, ..., bn), this then has consequences for the assemblage. For example, for n = 2,
∑
b2
σb1,b2|y1,y2 = σb1|y1,y2 = σb1|y1 , (6)
and likewise for larger n. At this point it is worthwhile pointing out that any assemblage that satisfies
these causality constraints in addition to non-signalling constraints, i.e., ∑b σb|y = ρA for all y, can be
realised by Alice and Bob sharing a quantum state and Bob making an appropriate sequence of
measurements, as proven in [18].
These are all of the constraints in the scenario that we are considering when allowing for
sequences of measurements on a state. The goal is given all of these constraints, to give bounds
on the guessing probability pguess(y∗) given an observed assemblage {σb|y}b,y. One method for doing
this is through semi-definite programming [11], and we will return to this technique when it comes to
presenting numerical results. We will also give analytical results based on self-testing in the steering
scenario [19]. One unifying aspect to our results is that instead of certifying randomness given the
observed assemblages, we can certify randomness based on the violation of steering inequalities,
which are analogous to Bell inequalities. More generally, a steering inequality violation results directly
from some observed statistics for Alice. Therefore we can certify randomness based on statistical tests
given particular (known) measurements made by Alice. Within this work, it will be made clear how
pguess(y∗) is being calculated.
Given the guessing probability pguess(y∗), we can compute a related quantity, which is the
certifiable min entropy of Bob’s outcomes:
Hmin(b|y∗, z) := − log2 pguess(y∗) (7)
As we can see this is directly related to the guessing probability. That is, if the set of possible
outcomes b has cardinality 2m and pguess(y∗) = 2−m then the min entropy associated with Bob’s
outcomes is m bits. In this way, Bob’s device is a source of m bits of certifiable randomness.
3. A Scheme for Unbounded Randomness Generation
In this section we will describe an honest strategy, in which a sequence of measurements made
upon half of a two-qubit entangled state can result in a large amount of observed randomness. In the
subsequent sections we will give methods to certify that this is genuine randomness, but for now we
will not concern ourselves with certification.
The scheme is similar to that of [7]. We will call this scheme the two-qubit sequential measurement
(TQSM) scheme. We have that Bob can implement non-projective measurements in “rotated versions”
of the Pauli-X and Z bases, and Alice has the functionality implement a tomographically complete set
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of measurements, for example to measure the Pauli observables, X, Y, Z since this is sufficient for her
to do quantum state tomography to certify Bob’s random outcomes.
First, for simplicity, we will consider Bob just making one sequence, i.e., a sequence of n
measurements for n = 1 so that y := y1 and b := b1. We have that Bob can make a choice between two
dichomotic measurements, so that y, b ∈ {0, 1}. When Bob makes choice y = 0 (y = 1), he will make a
(possibly non-projective) rotated version of a measurement in the Pauli-Z (Pauli-X) basis.
We will now describe these “rotated” measurements in terms of their associated Kraus operators.
These operators are of the formΠωb|y where ω is an angle and b, y are the bits as defined above. Consider
the following operators:
Πφ0|0 = cos(φ)|0〉〈0|+ sin(φ)|1〉〈1| (8)
Πφ1|0 = cos(φ)|1〉〈1|+ sin(φ)|0〉〈0|
Πθ0|1 = cos(θ)|+〉〈+|+ sin(θ)|−〉〈−|
Πθ1|1 = cos(θ)|−〉〈−|+ sin(θ)|+〉〈+|.
The positive operator valued measure (POVM) constructed from these Kraus operators that Bob
implements on his half of the shared state will be of the form
Mωb|y =
(
Πωb|y
)† (
Πωb|y
)
.
These Kraus operators reduce to the usual projective Pauli-X and Pauli-Z basis projectors for
θ = φ = 0. Therefore, if Alice and Bob share the pure quantum state |ψ〉AB and Bob makes a
measurement in, say, the rotated Pauli-X basis, and gets the outcome b = 1, the post-measurement
state will be
ρAB =
IA ⊗Πφ1|1|ψ〉〈ψ|IA ⊗Π
φ
1|1
|IA ⊗Πφ1|1|ψ〉|2
Very similar expressions are then obtained for the other Kraus operators. It should be noted
that for all pure states |ψ〉AB = α|00〉+ β|11〉 the post-measurement state ρAB will also be pure [7].
The post-measurement pure state shared by Alice and Bob after outcome b for input y will be
|ψb|y〉 = Ub|yA ⊗U
b|y
B
(
cos(ζb|y)|00〉+ sin(ζb|y)|11〉
)
. (9)
where unitaries Ub|yA and U
b|y
B , and angle ζb|y depend on the initial quantum state and the angle of the
rotated measurement. We point out that such an angle and unitaries exist (and can be calculated).
What is the probability of getting the outcome b given y? This will be p(b|y) = |IA ⊗Πφb|y|ψ〉|2.
We will only care about the case where y = 1, since for this case if |ψ〉 = α|00〉+ β|11〉 we have that
p(b|y) = |IA ⊗Πφb|y=1|ψ〉|2 =
1
2
.
Therefore, assuming that Alice and Bob share that state and Bob makes that measurement (in the
honest setting) then Bob’s outcome for y = 1 will be perfectly random. This will then be the basis of
the certified randomness in this scheme.
The above is what happens for a sequence consisting of one measurement. For sequences of
measurements of length n for n ≥ 2, the post-measurement state |ψb〉 as described in (9) will be
relevant. Note that up to the unitaries Ub|yA and U
b|y
B , the state |ψb|y〉 is of the form α|00〉 + β|11〉.
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Therefore, if after his first measurement, Bob applies the unitary (Ub|yB )
† to his share of the state,
the joint state will be
|ψb|y〉 = Ub|yA ⊗ I
(
cos(ζb|y)|00〉+ sin(ζb|y)|11〉
)
.
Now after applying this unitary, Bob can make another measurement that is a rotated Pauli
measurement. Now Bob’s input y will be a tuple of length 2, i.e., y = (y1, y2). For the second round,
Bob’s choices of measurements are again between two rotated Pauli basis measurements, where y2 = 0
is for the Z basis and y2 = 1 is for the X basis.
If y1 = y2 = 1, then Bob performs the rotated X measurement, followed by a correcting unitary,
then another rotated X measurement and another corrective unitary. The post-measurement state after
this second measurement (and unitary) will be
|ψb1,b2|1,1〉 = U
b1,b2|y1=1,y2=1
A ⊗ IB
(
cos(ζb1,b2|1,1)|00〉+ sin(ζb1,b2|1,1)|11〉
)
,
again for appropriately chosen unitaries and angles.
The probability of getting the outcomes b := (b1, b2) for inputs y = (1, 1) is straightforwardly
calculated to be p(b1, b2|1, 1) = 14 . Thus for a sequence of two measurements with each being the
rotated X basis measurement, we have two perfectly random outcomes (b1, b2). In general, for this
sequence of rotated measurement, correcting unitary, rotated measurement, and so on, if there n
measurements, then the probability p(b1, b2, ..., bn|y = (1, 1, ..., 1)) = 2−n.
This TQSM scheme thus gives us randomness assuming a particular state and sequence of
measurements made by Bob. In subsequent sections the goal will be to remove the assumptions of
the state and measurements but certify (almost) the same amount of randomness in the 1sDI scenario.
It turns out that the randomness in the TQSM scheme can be certified. That is, to reproduce the
observed assemblage (or statistics) between Alice and Bob, Eve would have to prepare devices that
implement something equivalent to, or extremely close to, the TQSM scheme. Since this scheme
produces a great deal of randomness, so will the certified version.
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to point out how this scheme differs from that presented
in [7]. The important distinction is that in the scheme of [7], in addition to Bob making a sequence of
measurements, Alice had to choose from a number of measurements that increased with the length of
the sequence. This is because the certification was done in the device-independent setting, and not
the 1sDI setting. The number of measurements Alice makes will never depend on the number of
measurements in the sequence; it will only depend on the dimension of Alice’s Hilbert space since she
only needs to do at most a tomographically complete measurement.
4. Certifiable Unbounded Randomness Generation
In this section we will give an analytical method for certifying the randomness in a sequential
scenario that is suited to the TQSM scheme. In particular, we will show that the TQSM scheme
can produce an unbounded amount of certifiable randomness: for an arbitrary integer N, there is a
sequence of measurements that produces Ω(N) bits of certifiable randomness.
In order to certify randomness in the 1sDI setting, we cannot assume the initial state shared by
Alice, Bob, and Eve nor the measurement sequence made by Bob; we can only assume the Hilbert
space of Alice’s system, which from now on will be assumed to be two, i.e., Alice holds a qubit system.
As mentioned earlier, it can assume that the state |ψ〉ABE shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve is pure. We can
additionally assume for cryptographic purposes that the measurements in Bob’s sequence are all
projective. For example, the non-projective measurements in the TQSM scheme can be simulated
by projective measurements on a potentially larger Hilbert space (we outline such an approach in
Appendix A).
We introduce notation to refer to Bob’s measurements. In particular we will introduce observables
for each of Bob’s measurements in the sequence. For the first measurement in the sequence, the choice
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of measurement corresponding to y1 = 0 and y1 = 1 will have the observable ZB = MB0|y1=0 −M
B
1|y1=0
and XB = MB0|y1=1 − M
B
1|y1=1 respectively, where M
B
b1|y1 being Bob’s POVM corresponding to the
outcome b1 for input y1. For subsequent measurements we will introduce a piece of notation that bi :=
(b1, b2, ..., bi) and yi := (y1, y2, ..., yi) will be the tuple of all values of bi and yi from 1 to i consecutively
(and inclusive). The observable corresponding to the (i + 1)th measurement in the sequence after
obtaining the outcomes bi for choices yi will be denoted as Zb
j |yi
B = M
B
0|bi ,yi ,yi+1=0 −M
B
1|bi ,yi ,yi+1=0 and
Xb
j |yi
B = M
B
0|bi ,yi ,yi+1=1 −M
B
1|bi ,yi ,yi+1=1.
The method for certifying this randomness is for Alice to choose between three of the Pauli
measurements. Note that Alice does not have to randomly choose between measurements. In each
round of the guessing game, Alice can choose a different Pauli basis, but this can be chosen
deterministically. Based on the statistics gathered from these three Pauli measurements and Bob’s
sequence of measurements. Note that every single-qubit observable can be written as a linear
combination of Pauli matrices so it is sufficient to make Pauli measurements and calculate the statistics
for an arbitrary observable a posteriori. As part of the certification we have statistical criteria that the
statistics obtained by Alice and Bob need to satisfy. If the statistics satisfy the criteria then this is the
certificate that the outcomes of Bob’s sequence of measurements is random. To wit, Eve will not be
able to perfectly predict the outcomes of Bob’s measurements. The statistical criteria will be based on
the TQSM scheme.
From the TQSM scheme we have that after the ith measurement and correctly unitary, the state of
Alice and Bob’s two-qubit state will be
|ψbi |yi 〉 = Ub
i |yi
A ⊗ IB
(
cos(ζbi |yi )|00〉+ sin(ζbi |yi )|11〉
)
. (10)
We will use the unitaries and angles in this post-measurement state to outline the statistical
criteria. For each measurement in a sequence, there will be statistical criteria that should be satisfied.
For simplicity we will start with the first measurement in the sequence.
The statistical criteria we will use can be derived from considering Alice and Bob both making
Pauli-X and Pauli-Z measurements on a two-qubit pure entangled state of the form α|00〉+ β|11〉.
The criteria essentially compares the observed statistics with those that would be obtained from perfect
Pauli measurements on such an entangled state. These criteria will be then be used for self-testing the
devices by showing that their behaviour will not deviate from Pauli measurements on an entangled
state. For future work, it would be of interest to use a steering inequality instead of these three seperate
criteria. Recall that the TQSM scheme is very similar to pure Pauli measurements on a two-qubit pure
entangled state, except for some rotation in the typically non-projective measurements. Hence we wish
to leverage this fact to produce certifiable randomness. The statistical criteria is
|〈τAZ ⊗ ZB〉 − 1| ≤ e1
|〈τAX ⊗ XB〉 − sin(2ζ)| ≤ e2
|〈τAZ 〉 − cos(2ζ)| ≤ e1, (11)
where τZ and τX are the Pauli-Z and Pauli-X observables respectively and e1, e2 are real, positive
numbers. The angle ζ just comes from the target pure state between Alice and Bob |ψ〉 = cos(ζ)|00〉+
sin(ζ)|11〉. For subsequent measurements in the sequence, after the ith measurement, we have the
following criteria for the (i + 1)th measurement in the sequence:
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|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Zbi |yiB 〉 − 1| ≤ ei+11
|〈Ubi |yiA τAX
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Xbi |yiB 〉 − sin(2ζbi |yi )| ≤ ei+12
|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
〉 − cos(2ζbi |yi )| ≤ ei+11 , (12)
where the unitary Ub
i |yi
A and ζbi |yi are the same as in (11). Just as with (11), e
1+1
1 and e
1+1
2 are real,
positive numbers. We will call the conjunction of the critera in (11) and all criteria (12) for all i the
sequential steering criteria (SSC).
It should be emphasised again that in the SCC, Alice does not need to make a measurement
corresponding to the observable Ub
i |yi
A τ
A
Z
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
, say, since for a known unitary Ub
i |yi
A ,
this observable can be written as a real linear combination of Pauli matrices. Thus Alice only needs to
measure the Pauli observables to recover the relevant expectation values.
If we take the TQSM scheme and start introducing parameters for the rotated measurements,
then we can adjust the SSC parameters to suit the TQSM scheme. For each measurement in the
sequence for the measurement in the rotated Pauli Z basis, we will fix the angle φ to be equal to zero
so that the POVM is for the outcome 0 (1) is |0〉〈0| (|1〉〈1|). For the rotated Pauli X measurement we fix
the angle to be θi for the ith measurement in the sequence, which we can fix later but it will be in the
range θi ∈]0, pi4 [. Therefore the POVM for yi = 1, we have Mθi0|yi=1 = cos(θi)|+〉〈+|+ sin(θi)|−〉〈−|
and Mθi1|yi=1 = cos(θi)|−〉〈−|+ sin(θi)|+〉〈+|.
One point to make at this stage is for the choice parameters to give the criteria in (13), after Bob
makes the measurement choice y1 = 0 in any round then he makes a projective measurement.
The problem with this is that the post-measurement state will be a product state, and no longer
entangled; entanglement is necessary to certify randomness in the 1sDI scenario we have here. To get
around this issue, we alter the scheme, as is suggested in [7], such that after any time Bob makes
a projective measurement, he does not make any more measurements in the sequence. That is,
a measurement in the (i + 1)th round will only follow the measurement choice yi = 1. Therefore,
the only bit-strings y that will be produced by Bob will be consist of a bit-value (0 or 1) prefixed by all
ones. When we look at numerical approaches to randomness certification we will relax this constraint
to look for optimal amounts of randomness.
When we put these details and values for the measurements into the SSC we obtain the
following bounds:
|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Zbi |yiB 〉 − 1| = 0
|〈Ubi |yiA τAX
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Xbi |yiB 〉 − sin(2ζbi |yi )| ≤ 2 sin2(θi)
|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
〉 − cos(2ζbi |yi )| = 0. (13)
We will use these values to certify the randomness produced by the TQSM scheme.
Coming back to randomness certification, for a sequence of measurements, the sequence of inputs
y∗, from which we will obtain a string of n random bits will be the all-ones string, i.e., y∗ = (1, 1, ..., 1).
The following (informally stated) result gives an upper bound on the guessing probability for Eve to
correctly guess Bob’s sequence of measurement outcomes.
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Theorem 1. For Bob making a sequence of n measurements yielding the outcome bit-string b of length n,
if Alice, Bob, and Eve share some initial state |ψ〉ABE, and if Eve makes a measurement associated with operators
{Mz}z, where z is Eve’s guess of Bob’s outcome b, Eve’s guessing probability is
pguess(y∗) =∑
z
δb,ztrAσz,b|y∗ . (14)
and if for each i, if the SSC is satisfied and for all ei1 and e
i
2 (with e
1
1 = e2 and e
1
1 = e2) from the statements of
the SSC, then
pguess ≤
n
∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
√
ei1
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
)
+ 3
√
ei1 + e
i
2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
, (15)
and if ei1 = 0 for all i, then
Pguess ≤
n
∏
i=1
(
1
2
+ 3
√
ei2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
. (16)
The proof of this theorem can be found in the Appendix A. This theorem uses techniques from
self-testing in the 1sDI setting as developed in [19]. Of independent interest we present a method to
self-test all partially entangled two-qubit states in a robust manner.
Given Theorem 1 we can certify an unbounded amount of randomness assuming all of the SSC is
satisfied. In particular, for the TQSM scheme we can give bounds on the amount of bits that will be
certified, as indicated in the following the result.
Theorem 2. If all statistics satisfy the SSC with ei1 = 0 and e
i
2 = 2 sin
2(θi) for all i and θi as a free choice
of angle that is assumed to be small, then the certifiable randomness Hmin(b|y∗, z) for Bob’s sequence of n
measurements is
Hmin(b|y∗, z) ≥ (1− c)n,
where c ∈]0, 1[. Furthermore, the TQSM scheme achieves this asymptotic behaviour as its resulting statistics
will satisfy the SSC for the chosen values ei1 = 0 and e
i
2 = 2 sin
2(θi) for all i.
Proof. If we take the result of Theorem 1 and convert the probability into a min entropy we have
Hmin(b|y∗, z) ≥ −
n
∑
i=1
log2
(
1
2
+ 3
√
ei2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
= n−
n
∑
i=1
log2
(
1+ 6
√
ei2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
≥ n− 6
ln2
n
∑
i=1
√
ei2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
)
= n− 6
ln2
n
∑
i=1
sin(θi)
(
1
sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+
√
2
)
≥ n− 6
√
2
ln2
n
∑
i=1
θi
(
1
ζbi−1|yi−1
+ 1
)
≥ n− 12
√
2
ln2
n
∑
i=1
θi
(
1
ζbi−1|yi−1
)
,
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where in the third line we have that ln(1 + α) ≤ α, and in the fourth line we use the value of
ei2 = 2 sin
2(θi) from the statement of the theorem. In the fifth line we have that sin(α) ≥ α√2 and
sin(α) ≤ α for α ∈]0, pi4 [, which will always be the case by construction. Then in the sixth line, we used
the fact that ( 1α + 1) ≤ 2α for α ∈]0, pi4 [, which will always be the case by construction. In the conditions,
we can choose θi = dζbi−1|yi−1 for constant d =
cln2
12
√
2
, such that Hmin(B|Y = 0, E) ≥ (1 − c)N,
thus completing the proof.
Note that by appropriate choice of the measurement parameters for the rotated Pauli-X basis
measurement we can get arbitrarily close to the n bits of randomness by reducing the constant
c in the statement of the theorem. We cannot reduce this constant to 0 since this would involve
one of the rotated Pauli-X measurements would become projective, and we would not be able to
certify randomness.
5. Numerical Results
The previous analytical results indicate that unbounded randomness is possible, but the methods
employed are perhaps sub-optimal in extracting the most randomness from the TQSM scheme. In this
section we will employ numerical techniques, similar to those developed in [11], to give an indication
of how robust the scheme is for randomness generation.
The methods employed in this section are based in semi-definite programming (SDP). We will
take the approach that given the violation of a steering inequality, can we certify the randomness.
A violation of a steering inequality implies that there must be certifiable randomness present. In this
way the violation of the steering inequality is the certificate for the randomness. First we will outline
how to derive a steering inequality from assemblages.
Given an assemblage, a method was derived to determine the steerability of the assemblage via
an SDP by Skrzypczyk et al. [20]. The steering weight (SW) is given to be the solution to the following
SDP, (17):
SW({σb|y}) = min 1− tr∑
λ
σλ
s.t. σb|y −∑
λ
D(b|y,λ)σλ ≥ 0 ∀b, y
σλ ≥ 0, ∀λ
(17)
where {σλ} is an assemblage that Eve could produce for Alice using hidden variables λ. This SDP has
a corresponding dual program given by:
SW({σb|y}) = max 1− tr∑
by
Fb|yσb|y
s.t. ∑
by
D(b|y,λ)Fb|y − 1 ≥ 0 ∀λ
Fb|y ≥ 0, ∀b, y
. (18)
The dual program, (18), is the most relevant for this work, as shown in [20], the dual variables of
the SDP, (18), in fact define a steering inequality, {Fb|y}, for which the assemblage, {σb|y}, produces an
optimal violation, if one exists. We will use these steering inequalities as the fundamental building
block for our sequential certification scheme.
We now return to calculating the certifiable randomness in terms of the guessing probability for
Eve to guess Bob’s measurement outcomes. For simplicity, we will first study the case of a single
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measurement before giving the results for a sequence of measurements. With just a single measurement,
the maximum guessing probability is given as the solution to the following SDP:
pguess = max
{σEb |y}b,y
trAσEb|y∗
s.t. ∑
b,y
Fb|yσEb|y = v
∑
b
σEb|y = ∑
b
σEb|y′ ∀z, y 6= y′
σEb|y  0 ∀y, b
. (19)
The steering inequality {Fb|y} is the one determined by the SDP (18), which is optimally violated
by the observed assemblage. The SDP (19) allows Eve to create, for Alice, any assemblage, {σEb|y},
as long as this assemblage obeys the constraints in the SDP.
The first constraint enforces the fact that this assemblage should produce the observed violation
of the steering inequality, {Fb|y}, which is found as a result of Alice computing the optimal values
for the steering weight SDP (18). Of course, if the assemblage that Alice observes is not steerable, i.e.,
it produces a steering weight of 0, then this will be reflected in the observed violation of a steering
inequality, i.e., there will not be one for any steering inequality. The second constraint enforces that
Alice and Bob cannot communicate faster than the speed of light (no-signalling condition), while the
last constraint enforces that Eve must produce a valid assemblage for Alice i.e., it must be a positive
semidefinite matrix.
We can now extend this scenario to one in which Bob implements a sequence of measurements on
his half of the shared state. Defining the protocol for n rounds is therefore straightforward. The idea
will be that for each measurement in the sequence there will be a steering inequality, and an observed
violation. The steering inequalities and violations will be obtained from the assemblages produced
by the TQSM scheme, where the SW is calculated and a steering inequality generated for each
measurement round in the sequence of measurements. Once we have this set of steering inequalities,
she can determine the guessing probability for Eve, as the solution of the following SDP:
pguess = max
b,y
trAσEb|y=y∗ s.t.
∑
b,y
Fb|yσEb|y = vn,
∑
bn−1,yn−1
Fbn−1|yn−1σEbn−1|yn−1 = vn−1
...
...
∑
b1,y1
Fb1|y1σ
E
b1|y1 = v1,
∑
bn
σEb|y = σ
E
bn−1|yn−1 , ∀yn
∑
bn−1
σEbn−1|yn−1 = σ
E
bn−2|yn−2 ∀yn−1
...
...
∑
b1
σEb1|y1 = ρA ∀y1
∑
b
σEb|y = ∑
b
σEb|y′ ∀y, y′
∑
bn−1
σEbn−1|yn−1 = ∑
bn−1
σE
bn−1|yn−1 ′ ∀y
n−1, yn−1′
...
...
∑
b1
σEb1|y1 = ∑b1
σEb1|y′1
∀y1, y′1
σEb|y  0 ∀y, b
σEbn−1|yn−1  0 ∀yn−1, bn−1
...
...
σEb1|y1  0 ∀y1, b1
The solution of this SDP is the guessing probability and the maximum over the trace of all
the assemblages that Eve can create for Alice at the end of the protocol, σEb|y=y∗ , for a particular
input string, y∗. Again, Eve knows from which measurement settings, y∗, Bob wants to extract
randomness. The steering inequality violations can be calculated by Alice for the assemblage she
observes. The constraints of the SDP are similar to the single measurement case except for the
addition of one new set of constraints that are required for a sequence. These particular constraints
enforce causality in the measurement sequence, as mentioned earlier. Recall that, as mentioned earlier,
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any assemblage satisfying these constraints can be implemented by Alice and Bob sharing a quantum
state and by Bob making appropriate measurements [18].
To obtain the most amount of randomness, for the final measurement round, the measurement
operators will become projective, i.e., θn = φn = 0 and the state at round n − 1 should be a pure
entangled state. In this case, it is possible to define the steering inequality explicitly, as done in [20]:
Fb|y = α
(
1− σb|y
tr(σb|y)
)
(20)
where α is chosen sufficiently large. A choice of α = 100 was chosen for all numerical results in this
paper. Clearly, this choice of a steering inequality automatically gives a violation value of vn = 0.
Ideal Case
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate the performance of the TQSM scheme
assuming ideal functionality of devices. As a convention, it will be assumed that Bob always measures
in the noisy X basis in the first round, with the final measurement round in the protocol being projective,
θn = 0 or φn = 0, depending on whether n is odd or even. We will also allow for the possibility that
both of Bob’s possible measurements for each measurement in the sequence can be non-projective.
For completeness, the min entropy for one round of measurement is plotted as a function of
measurement angles used for the first round, with the rotated X measurements for a range of values of
θ1, as seen in Figure 2. All measurements are applied on the following initial pure state:
|Ψ(ζ1)〉 = cos(ζ1)|00〉+ sin(ζ1)|11〉. (21)
|Ψ(ζ1)〉 was measured for values of: ζ1 ∈ {0, pi32 , pi16 , pi8 , pi4 }. The solution of this SDP clearly
reproduces the already known results for a single measurement round, as is done in [11,21], but using
our SDP, which is slightly different than the one derived in those works. As expected, when ζ1 = 0,
no randomness can be certified as the state becomes a product state. In the opposite end of the
spectrum, for ζ1 = pi/4, the maximal amount of randomness can be certified, since this state is
maximally entangled between Alice and Bob.
Figure 2. Hmin for one round of measurements, using a range of initial states, ζ1, as a function of initial
measurement angle, θ1.
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Figure 3a,b shows the results after two measurement rounds. In Figure 3a, the measurement in
round one was taken to be in the noisy X basis, with a range of initial angles ζ1, and the measurement
in round two was taken to be in the usual computational basis, φ2 = 0. Figure 3b illustrates the
difference in choosing different measurement choices for the second round, i.e., between y∗2 = 0,
or y∗2 = 1, with maximal randomness certified after sequential measurements in alternating bases,
y∗1 = 1, y
∗
2 = 0. We cut the graphs at the extremes of the measurement angles (θ1 = {0,pi/4}) in order
to avoid the discontinuity that occurs as soon as the first round measurement undergoes the transition
from projective to non-projective.
An interesting feature of the protocol can be seen in Figure 3a, for the case of ζ1 = pi/4. It turns
out that in this case a maximal amount of randomness can be certified, for all initial measurement
angles, θ1. This behaviour illustrates the fundamental difference between the steering, and fully device
independent scenario and the more robust nature of quantum steering. In the latter, one observes
the amount of certifiable randomness decreases monotonically as (θ1 → 0), corresponding to the first
round measurement becoming non-interactive. We leave a further analysis of this phenomenon to
future work.
(a) (b)
Figure 3. (a) Hmin for two rounds of measurements, with a range of initial states, ζ1 ∈ (0, pi4 ] and
φ1 = θ2 = φ2 = 0. (b) Difference in certified randomness when choosing between measurement
settings y∗2 = 1 or y∗2 = 0 in the second measurement round.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates numerical results for the protocol with three measurement rounds.
The protocol proceeds in exactly the same manner as for one and two rounds. In particular, in the
first round, Bob can choose between a non-projective measurement in the noisy Xθ1 basis, or if the
particular run of the protocol is a test, he will measure in the projective Z0 basis. In the second round,
he will choose to measure in the noisy Zφ2 basis, or the X0 basis for a test run. In the final round,
he will choose to measure in the projective (θ3 = 0) X0 basis, or the projective (φ3 = 0) Z0 basis for
a test. Again, Figure 4b reiterates the optimality of using an alternating sequence of non-projective
measurements, with the most randomness produced with the setting y∗1 = 1, y
∗
2 = 0, y
∗
3 = 1 in this
example. Figure 4c shows the results for various second round measurement angles, and the amount
of randomness that can be certified increases as the measurement angle, φ2 → 0.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4. (a) Hmin using various initial states, with initial angles, ζ1 ∈ {pi4 , pi5 , pi7 , pi8 , pi12}. (b) Hmin
using various measurement settings, y∗1 , y∗2 , y∗3 . (c) Hmin using various angles in the second round,
φ2 ∈ {0.08, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, pi4 } rad.
In these results we see that the amount of randomness that can be certified using the numerics
is quite robust. This then could make this scheme amenable to experiment. In the next section
we will adapt these numerical techniques to look at experimental feasibility of this randomness
certification scheme.
6. Towards Experimental Implementations
6.1. Networked Ion Trap Implementation
The framework in which we have designed this protocol, assuming a malicious adversary, Eve,
is general enough to include the scenario in which she is not intentionally trying to interfere with our
randomness generation, but instead we can imagine that Eve simply made some error in building
the devices. This would correspond to introducing some noise, for example, in our state preparation
and/or measurement apparatus. This noise assumption is clearly a subcase of the malicious adversary
scenario. This mentality allows us to use our protocol to evaluate the usefulness of some current
available technologies for randomness generation purposes, in some simple cases. In particular, we will
restrict to assuming we only have some noise in our state preparation, but all other parts of the device
works perfectly. To do so, we test the state introduced in [22], which can be produced between two
parties in a networked architecture of ion traps:
ρe = (1− e)Φ+ + e3Φ
− + e
3
Ψ+ +
e
3
Ψ− (22)
where φ+, φ−, ψ+, and ψ− are the standard 2-qubit Bell states. The state, (22), is a mixed state assuming
uniform depolarising noise. In [22], this state is assumed to be one produced by two ion traps entangled
by a photonic link. The simple noise model is chosen to allow use of a technique to purify the state.
In particular, after three rounds of this purification protocol, the resulting states are given by:
ρ
(0)
e = (1− e)Φ+ + e3Φ
− + e
3
Ψ+ +
e
3
Ψ− (23)
ρ
(1)
e =
(
1− 2
3
e− 2
3
e2
)
Φ+ +
(
2
9
e+
2
9
e2
)
Φ− + 2
9
e2Ψ+ +
2
9
e2Ψ− +O(e3) (24)
ρ
(2)
e =
(
1− 8
9
e2 − 8
27
e3
)
Φ+
4
9
e2Φ− + 4
9
e2Ψ+ +
8
27
e3Ψ− +O(e4) (25)
ρ
(3)
e =
(
1− 2
9
e2 − 16
27
e3
)
Φ+
2
9
e2Φ− + 8
27
e3Ψ+ +
8
27
e3Ψ− +O(e4) (26)
where ρ(i)e is the state produced after i rounds of the purification protocol.
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Currently, raw entanglement between two ion traps, connected with an entangling photon,
has been achieved with a fidelity of about 85% =⇒ e ≈ 0.15 [23]. Starting with this level of raw
infidelity, the purification protocol produces states of infidelity e ≈ 0.1, 0.02, and 0.005 after one, two,
and three rounds respectively. The fidelity is given by (27) [24], and taken to be between the actual
state ρ(i), and the pure Bell state, Φ+:
F(ρ(i)e ,Φ+) = Tr
(√√
ρ
(i)
e Φ+
√
ρ
(i)
e
)
(27)
Given the levels of entanglement present in the states above, we test the advantage of using a
sequence of measurements vs. a single measurement on a noisy entangled state. Figure 5a shows
the result after a single X measurement on the states (choosing y∗1 = 1) (23)–(26). Clearly, maximal
randomness can be certified in the case where the measurement is projective, as expected. It can also
be seen that by using the raw entangled state, (23), very little randomness can be certified, with a
maximum of approximately 0.15 bits.
Figure 5b illustrates the results after two rounds of measurements, where the second round
measurements are projective, θ2 = φ2 = 0. The case of θ1 = 0 gives the same result as the single
measurement scenario, since in this case the first measurement is projective and hence no randomness
can be certified in the second round.
Unfortunately, it can be seen that no extra randomness can be certified in two measurement
rounds on the raw entangled state, (22). However, after two or more rounds of the purification
protocol, indeed more randomness can be certified by using a sequence vs. a single measurement,
as indicated by the peaks in Figure 5b. The infidelity for which the sequence becomes more useful
than a single measurement can be seen to be approximately in the interval e ∈ (0.06, 0.07).
(a) (b)
Figure 5. (a) Single measurement on the raw entangled state (22) (e = 0.15), the states produced after
three rounds of the purification protocol, (24)–(26), with e = 0.1, 0.02, and 0.005 respectively and a
perfect pure state with e = 0. (b) Two rounds of measurement on the raw entangled state (22) (e = 0.15),
the states produced after three rounds of the purification protocol, with the same parameters as (a).
Finally, Figure 6a shows the results after three rounds of measurements, where the third, and final
round of measurements are projective with θ3 = φ3 = 0. The second round of measurements is chosen
in this case to be a noisy Z measurement, with φ2 = 0.08 rad.
Unfortunately, it can be seen that no extra randomness can be certified by implementing three
measurements, than with two rounds. This is even the case for the purified states, (24)–(26), so even
these levels of purity are not sufficient to extract more randomness from a single state with three
rounds of measurements. The perfect pure state, with e = 0 is also plotted for comparison.
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Clearly, one would expect the existence of some level at which the state becomes pure enough to
be useful so Figure 6b shows the results of the protocol for very small infidelities, specifically:
e = {5× 10−3, 5× 10−4, 3× 10−4, 2× 10−4, 1× 10−4}.
(a) (b)
Figure 6. (a) Three rounds of measurement on the raw entangled state, (22), (e = 0.15), the states
produced after three rounds of the purification protocol, (24)–(26), with e = 0.1, 0.02, and 0.005
respectively and a perfect pure state with e = 0. (b) Three rounds of measurement on raw entangled
states with infidelities e = {5× 10−3, 5× 10−4, 3× 10−4, 2× 10−4, 1× 10−4}.
It can be seen that for an infidelity approximately in the interval, e ∈ (1× 10−4, 2× 10−4), the state
is pure enough to be able to certify more randomness with three rounds of measurement, than with
two. This corresponds to being able to create pure entangled states experimentally with fidelities of
greater than 99.98%. This level could be reached by repeating the purification protocol more times
but clearly this decreases the efficiency of the protocol as many more extra qubits would need to be
introduced to implement this purification. Furthermore, for four and higher rounds of measurement,
states that have an even higher level of purity would be required to make the protocol worthwhile, i.e.,
so that rounds of measurements on a single state would give better results than single measurements
on new states each time.
6.2. Atom–Photon Implementation
We also examined a potential state arising from an atom–photon (AP) interaction. This case is even
more applicable to the above 1sDI scenario as discussed in Section 1. In light of this, it makes sense to
consider a situation where an entangled state is produced by some process between an atom, and a
coherent photon state. As an example, we investigate the state produced in [25], which is the simplest
for our purposes since it only involves single photon and vacuum states. However, an alternative
method, using coherent photon states, such as the approach of [26,27] could be studied. These scenarios
are particularly relevant as the authors have the aim of performing a Bell test, and observing a violation
of a Bell inequality.
It is possible to examine two possible cases in this scenario, since the setup is asymmetric. We can
either consider noise introduced in either imperfections in the atom side, or on the photon side.
The ideal case considered in [25] is given by (keeping our notation):
|Ψζ1〉 = cos(ζ1)|0, g〉+ sin(ζ1)|1, s〉 (28)
where |g〉, |s〉 are two atomic states (held by Bob) and |0〉, |1〉 are the photon vacuum and single photon
state respectively, held by Alice.
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For simplicity, we will consider two of the cases presented in [25] as sources of imperfections.
The first error is introduced in the transmission efficiency, and we also consider the possibility that
the photon was lost during the transmission. The transmission inefficiency is given by ηt, and if the
photon is lost, we get an extra contribution to the overall state corresponding to |0, s〉, with a weight of
sin2(ζ1)(1− ηt), such that the final state is given by:
ρηt = N|Ψζ1ηt 〉〈Ψζ1ηt |+ sin2(ζ1)(1− ηt)|s, 0〉〈s, 0| (29)
where:
|Ψζ1ηt 〉 =
1
N
(cos(ζ1)|0, g〉+ sin(ζ1)√ηt|1, s〉), (30)
N = cos2(ζ1) + sin2(ζ1)ηt. (31)
Since both sets of atomic, (A), and photonic, (P), states are orthogonal to each other, we can make
the translation to ‘logical’ basis states: |g〉 → |0〉A, |s〉 → |1〉A, |0〉 → |0〉P, |1〉 → |1〉P the state is given
in the computational basis by:
ρηt =

c2 0 0
√
ηtcs
0 s2(1− ηt) 0 0
0 0 0 0√
ηtcs 0 0 ηts2
 . (32)
Where we have defined c = cos(ζ1), s = sin(ζ1) Figure 7 illustrates the results after one,
two, and three measurement rounds for an atom–photon state (29) with ζ1 = pi/4. Values of the
transmission efficiency, ηt were chosen for interest to correspond with those described in [26]. In that
paper, the authors examine Bell inequality violations where Bob (Alice in our case) has access to the
photonic system, and can make either homodyne measurements or photon counting to determine his
Bell statistics. This intuitively corresponds in our case to his choice of measurement basis. Alternatively,
Bob might not use photon counting, but instead choose between homodyne measurements in two
different quadratures. Values of ηt = {61%, 79%} are the required levels of efficiency to produce a
Bell violation, if the measurements on the photonic side are either homodyne and photon counting,
or both homodyne respectively. It should be noted that in our case, we would not need to distinguish
between these two cases as we do not need to reproduce statistics for binary outcomes on Alice’s side,
since she is fully trusted, and needs only to do state tomography on the photonic mode. As such,
the measurement scheme that allows her to more easily do tomography is the one that should be
chosen in the actual implementation of our protocol. Also, a value of ηt = 93% was plotted as this is
the level that would be required to close the locality loophole in the Bell violation, as stated in [26].
From Figure 7a, it can be seen that for a value of ηt = 61%, more randomness can be certified with
a single measurement with the AP state, than with the one produced in two ion traps, with a fidelity of
e = 85%, as in the latter case, only about 0.15 random bits could be certified, but in the former over 0.2
random bits can be certified.
In this implementation, we see once again see the same general trends as with the ion trap
apparatus. At some level of transmission efficiency, illustrated by ηt = 99%, ηt = 99.98% in Figure 7b,c
respectively, the state becomes pure enough for a sequence to become worthwhile. In particular,
for ηt = 99%, two measurements on the state generates more certifiable randomness than is possible
with one, and for ηt = 99.98%, we can get more than two certifiable random bits.
As a result, we can see that this particular atom photon model has more promise for randomness
certification than the ion trap model, although it may be an unfair comparison to directly compare
transmission efficiency in the former case to state fidelity in the latter. However, while the state in [22]
only takes into account a very simple depolarising noise model, which may be unrealistic in practice,
the atom–photon state, (29), of [26] takes into account all coupling errors in the state preparation
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between Alice and Bob. Another interesting property to investigate would be the detection efficiency
of the photons and how this effects the protocol.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7. (a) Hmin for one round, for various levels of ηt. (b) Hmin for two rounds, for various levels
of ηt. (c) Hmin for three rounds, for various levels of ηt. The second round measurement angle is
φ2 = 0.08 rad.
6.3. Nitrogen-Vacancy Center Implementation
Next, we consider an entangled state produced between Alice and Bob using qubits based on
electronic spins of nitrogen-vacancy defect centers in diamond. In particular, we examine the state
used in the first loophole free Bell test, [2,28]. This state is again relevant due to its use in the Bell test,
and as mentioned in [2], the setup could readily be used for randomness certification, albeit in a fully
device independent scenario. The shared state between Alice and Bob in this experiment is given by
the following density matrix:
ρNV =
1
2

1− Fz 0 0 0
0 Fz −V 0
0 −V Fz 0
0 0 0 1− Fz
 (33)
where, Fz = 1/2[(1− eAearly)(1− eBlate) + (1− eBearly)(1− eAlate)], and V is the visibility that describes the
indistinguishibility of the photons used to create entanglement. The residual errors, eA/Bearly/late, are due
to the spin-photon coupling, as described in [2]. In this case, the ideal case is not particular Bell state
we have assumed above, Φ+, instead it is another Bell state, Ψ− = |ψ−〉〈ψ−|, |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
The best estimate for the visibility is given to be V = 0.873 ± 0.060, and the residual errors are
found to be eAearly = 1.4± 0.2%, eBearly = 1.6± 0.2%, eAlate = 0.8± 0.4%, eBlate = 0.7± 0.4%. For these
values, the fidelity of the state used in their Bell test is reported to be 〈ψ−|ρNV |ψ−〉 = 0.92± 0.03,
and Fz ≈ 0.9775.
Figure 8 shows the results of the protocol when the electronic spin state, (33), is used. In the
experiment described in [2], a very pure state was required to implement a reliable Bell test, and due
to this, the state is substantially better for randomness certification than that available in the ion
trap, or atom–photon implementation, with it being possible to certify 0.65± 0.05 random bits using
electronic spins with a single measurement. Also, in both Figure 8b,c, the effect of the residual errors
can be seen to have a large consequence when it comes to randomness certification, and ultimately
the state purity. For example, in Figure 8b with a perfect visibility of V = 1 and using a value of
Fz = 0.9775 a maximum of 1.5 bits can be certified with two measurements, which is substantially less
than then maximal amount of 2 bits that can certified with a perfect pure state. A similar feature can be
seen in Figure 8c for three measurement rounds. It would also be interesting to study the effect of the,
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∆Fz, derived from the statistical uncertainties on eA/Bearly/late, on the amount of randomness producible
by the state. ∆Fz = 0 was assumed in our numerical results for clarity.
The sensitivity of the randomness certification to errors is especially apparent in Figure 8c. For a
reduction in visibility, V, by only 0.1%, the amount of random bits drops by almost a full unit. Similarly,
a reduction in Fz by 0.023 leads to a loss of 1/2 a random bit, and even with this small drop, the situation
changes from one in which a sequence of three measurements can do better than is ever possible with
two, to a scenario in which two measurement rounds produce a very similar amount of certifiable
randomness, and the third measurement is almost unnecessary.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8. Hmin using NV center state. The full blue line in each figure represents the best experimental
estimate of [2] corresponding to V = 0.873, Fz = 0.9775. The dashed blue lines represent the effect
of the error in the visibility, corresponding to states with ∆V = ±0.060. Also, states with perfect
visibility, V = 1, but with residual errors, Fz = 0.9775, along with a perfect pure Bell state, Ψ−, are also
plotted for comparison. Results for: (a) a single measurement, (b) two measurements, and (c) for three
measurement rounds, with a second round measurement angle of φ2 = 0.08 rad, all with various
θ1 values.
6.4. Implementation on Rigetti Forest Platform
As a final example, we implement the protocol using Rigetti’s Forest Platform [29]. This is done
in a proof of principle way using the following circuit:
yn •
|0n〉 Zyn⊕10 X
yn
0 Z(n)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
y2 •
|02〉 Zy2⊕1φ2 X
y2
θ2 Z(2)
y1 •
|01〉 Zy1⊕1φ1 X
y1
θ1 Z(1)
ρB Z X Z X Z X↑ ↑ ↑
Round 1 Measurement Round 2 Measurement Round n Measurement
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where we have defined the following two qubit unitary gates, that effectively implement the
non-projective measurements in the X and Z bases, denoted as Xθ , respectively.
|0i〉 Xθ = Ry(2θ) H • H
|ψ〉 X X
|0i〉 Zφ = Ry(2φ) H • H
|ψ〉 Z Z
The index on the ancilla represents the measurement round it is used in. The input string, y,
for n measurement rounds is used as classical input to the circuit, and conditioned on this input for
each round, either the noisy X or noisy Z measurement is implemented. As mentioned above, it is
the topmost ancilla that is used as a control qubit for each gate in the circuit. At the end of each
round of the protocol, a single ancillas can be measured in the usual computational basis, where Z(k)
represents the measurement done in round k. Clearly, if the input yk = 0, the noisy Z measurement is
implemented, Zyk⊕1φk , while if yk = 1, the noisy X measurement is implemented, X
yk
θk
, and the other is
not. In this fashion, only one quantum gate acts on the state per measurement round. Also, the state
|ψ〉B is only Bob’s initial reduced state.
The circuit could be further improved since it is possible to only use a single ancilla. This ancilla
would undergo multiple measurements, with the addition of a series of CNOT gates to the ancilla
wire in order to reset the ancilla post measurement. These CNOT gates would return the ancilla to
the usual |0〉 state conditioned on the previous measurement outcome. It is actually essential that the
measurements occur in a sequential manner, i.e., it is Bob’s post-measurement state, which is rotated
in the next round of the protocol. In this way, the measurements actually cannot be deferred to the end
of the circuit since if this was done, there would be a cheating strategy for Eve. Causality is essential
for the proper security of the protocol. However, since the quantum hardware prohibits intermediate
measurements in a quantum circuit, and instead it is necessary to defer all measurements to the end of
the circuit. While this would not be sufficient for security against a malicious adversary, it is useful as
a proof-of principle, assuming any deviation occurs from noise errors alone.
To implement the protocol, we proceed as described above and perform tomography on Alice’s
qubit, ρA after the sequence of measurements on Bob’s qubit, ρB (deferred onto the ancillary
qubits). We proceed using the simulator of the Aspen quantum processing unit (QPU) with the
sublattice Aspen-4-3Q-A. With this scheme, we require an 2+ n qubit chip to implement n sequential
measurements. We perform direct inversion tomography [30] by measuring the expectation values of
the Pauli Observables, X, Y, Z to reconstruct the state:
ρA =
1
2
(
1+ rxX + ryY + rzZ
)
. (34)
Direct inversion tomography is the simplest method of state tomography, and compensates for
the fact that, due to measurement errors, the state which is estimated naively may lie outside the Bloch
Sphere (i.e., it has a norm greater than 1). If this is the case, the vector, r = (rx, ry, rz) is simply rescaled
by its norm in the following way:
rˆ =
{
r if ||r||2 ≤ 1
r/||r||2 if ||r||2 > 1
(35)
where ||x||2 =
(|x1|2 + |x2|2 + |x3|2)1/2 is the `2 norm. The original vector is estimated by
approximating the expectation values, (tr(XρA), tr(YρA), tr(ZρA)). This is achieved by counting
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the number of times the positive eigenvalue is observed, minus the number of times the negative
eigenvalue is observed and normalising the answer, for each operator.
However, when implementing the protocol on the simulator, Alice can use her foreknowledge that
Bob makes measurements only in the noisy X/Z bases. In this case, the steered states, ρA, would have
no Y contribution so Alice would only be required to estimate (tr(XρA), tr(ZρA). However, if the
protocol was to run on the physical hardware, it would be necessary to include measurements of the Y
observable also. To generate the full assemblage, this must be done for each of Bob’s measurement
choices and outcomes, σb|y. The full protocol requires the assemblage after each round, σbi |yi∀i ≤ n,
but it is sufficient to compute these from the final round assemblages elements. This is due to the
causality relationship ∑bi σbi |yi = σbi−1|yi−1 .
Figure 9 illustrates the protocol using Rigetti’s Simulator of sublattices of the QPU containing
three, four, and five qubits to implement one, two, and three measurement rounds in Figure 9a,
Figure 9b, and Figure 9c respectively. For a single measurement, the results are encouraging, but this is
because 100,000 measurements allows a good characterisation of the four assemblage elements received
by Alice. It is apparent that the exponential scaling quickly overtakes the number of measurements
such that three measurement rounds do not increase the randomness certified over two, it actually
reduces it. Unfortunately, we were not able to get sensible results when running the protocol on the
QPU versions of the corresponding simulators in Figure 9, even for a single measurement, due to noise.
Potentially, this could be mitigated by using more sophisticated tomography techniques.
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Figure 9. Hmin for (a) one, (b) two, and (c) three measurement rounds on Rigetti Aspen Simulator
using the pure entangled state (21), with ζ1 = pi/4. Nmeas is the number of measurements taken when
estimating each of the expectations values required to approximate (34). Also plotted for comparison is
the limit of infinite measurements, such that the ideal assemblage elements are obtained. In each case,
the protocol is run five times, with the average Hmin plotted, and the error bars represent the maximum
and minimum values obtained over the five runs. Figures (d–f) illustrate the chip simulator topology
used for one, two, and three measurements respectively. The qubits shared between Alice and Bob are
indicated also.
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7. Discussion
We presented a novel protocol to certify an unbounded amount of random numbers from
sequential measurements on one half of a quantum state shared by two parties, building on the
work of [7,11,21]. The ‘certificate’ in this case can be a set of statistical criteria or the states into which
the other party is ‘steered’ as a result of the sequence of well-chosen measurements. We studied
the behaviour of the scheme both in the ideal setting, and in experimentally realistic settings, [22],
including those which have actually been implemented [2,25]. We also demonstrated the feasibility of
the scheme in being able to certify multiple random bits produced from a single quantum state, rather
than multiple states each producing only one bit. This distinction is important given the valuable
nature of controlled quantum systems, and hence represents an important step in resource reduction.
Our scheme could be readily turned into a protocol for randomness expansion, especially now
that we have improved upon the work of [7] in reducing the number of measurements required.
We leave this to future work.
Interesting future work would be to investigate the reason behind the apparent anomaly in the
steering scenario with two sequential measurements on a maximally entangled state, as discussed
in Section 5. Given our focus in this work on studying the behaviour of the protocol in realistic
experimental implementations, it would be insightful to actually implement the protocol in a physical
system, similar to those carried out in Bell testing, [2].
8. Materials and Methods
All numerical results in this work were obtained using the Matlab convex optimisation package,
cvx, [31] and a package for managing quantum states, qetlab, [32]. The resulting code required to
produce all images in this work is available at [33].
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
We will at first consider the case of a single round of the scheme outlined in this paper, that is,
when Bob’s first measurement is his only one. Recall that Eve has created a quantum state |ψABE〉 with
sub-systems denoted by A, B, and E, which are Alice, Bob, and Eve’s respective subsystems.
We want to bound Eve’s guessing probability of the outcome b of Bob’s measurement. In order to
do this we will constrain what form |ψABE〉 takes, and if the dichotomic observable corresponding to
Bob’s measurement is denoted XB, we will also constrain the form of IA⊗XB⊗ IE|ψABE〉. In particular,
we will use the techniques of self-testing in the one-sided device-independent setting [19] to show
that there exists a local isometry acting on Bob’s systems that map the state |ψABE〉 to the state
|ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′ , where B′ denotes a virtual qubit system held by Bob respectively such that |ζ〉AB′ =
cos(ζ)|00〉+ sin(ζ)|11〉, and E′ is an arbitrary virtual system held by Eve. We also show something
analogous for IA ⊗ XB ⊗ IE|ψABE〉.
To rigorously establish our self-testing results, we first need to establish the statistical conditions
that need to be satisfied. Bob’s aforementioned observable XB has two eigenvalues taking the values
±1 (corresponding to the binary outcomes b). Without loss of generality, Bob’s observable can be
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taken to be sharp with eigenvalues +1 and −1 being associated with projectors Σ0B and Σ1B respectively
such that Σ0B + Σ
1
B = IB and Σ0B − Σ1B = XB. In addition to XB, Bob has a second sharp observable
ZB with eigenvalues +1 and −1 being associated with projectors Π0B and Π1B respectively such that
Π0B +Π
1
B = IB and Π0B −Π1B = ZB. In addition to Bob’s measurement, we denote Alice’s Pauli X and
Z matrices as τX and τZ respectively. Now we can state the statistical criteria that Alice and Bob need
to satisfy: ∣∣∣〈τAZ ⊗ ZB〉 − 1∣∣∣ ≤ e1∣∣∣〈τAX ⊗ XB〉 − sin(2ζ)∣∣∣ ≤ e2∣∣∣〈τAZ 〉 − cos(2ζ)∣∣∣ ≤ e1 (A1)
with e1 and e2 being small error terms, i.e., a positive real number. We chose the errors to have this
symmetry motivated by our original scheme, as will hopefully be clear.
We can now state the self-testing result we will need:
Theorem A1. If Alice and Bob’s statistics satisfy the criteria in (A1) and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ], then there exist a quantum
state |anc〉 ∈ HE′ in Hilbert spaceHE′ and local isometry ΦB such that
‖IA ⊗ΦB ⊗ IE(|ψABE〉)− |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖ ≤
√
e1(
√
2+ 1) +
√
e1 + e2∥∥∥IA ⊗ΦB ⊗ IE(IA ⊗ XB ⊗ IE|ψABE〉)− IA ⊗ τB′X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′∥∥∥ ≤ √e1 (2√2+ 1+ 52 sin(ζ)
)
+
√
e1 + e2
(
3√
2 sin(ζ)
+ 2
)
.
To prove this result we need to state a few lemmas. Before doing this, we will simplify notation to
have to have |ψ〉 := |ψABE〉 and we will suspend denoting tensor products and identities when it is
clear from context. The lemmas we need now follow.
Lemma A1. If (A1) is satisfied and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ] the following is true:
‖(|x〉〈x|A −ΠxB) |ψ〉‖ ≤
√
e1
2
,
for x ∈ {0, 1} and {|x〉}x being the computational basis, i.e., the eigenstates of τZ.
Proof. We will proof the case where x = 0, but the proof for x = 1 is essentially the same. Note that
by definition:
‖
(
|0〉〈0|A −Π0B
)
|ψ〉‖ =
√
|〈ψ|0〉A|2 + 〈Π0B〉 − 2〈ψ|0〉〈0|AΠ0B|ψ〉
=
√
1
2
− 1
2
(〈ψ|(2|0〉〈0|A − IA)⊗ (2Π0B − IB)|ψ〉)
=
√
1
2
− 1
2
〈τAZ ZB〉
≤
√
e1
2
,
where the first line of (A1) was used in the final inequality.
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Lemma A2. If (A1) is satisfied and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ] the following is true:
‖ (sin(ζ)|1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)|1〉〈1|AXB) |φ〉‖ ≤
√
e1 + e2
2
‖ (cos(ζ)|0〉〈1|A − sin(ζ)|0〉〈0|AXB) |φ〉‖ ≤
√
e1 + e2
2
.
Proof. We will prove the first case as the second case has essentially the same proof. By definition
we have
‖ (sin(ζ)|1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)|1〉〈1|AXB) |φ〉‖ =√
sin2(ζ)|〈0|ψ〉A|2 + cos2(ζ)|〈1|ψ〉A|2 − sin(ζ) cos(ζ)〈ψ|τAX XB|ψ〉
≤
√
sin2(ζ)(cos2(ζ) +
e1
2
) + cos2(ζ)(sin2(ζ) +
e1
2
)− sin(ζ) cos(ζ)(sin(2ζ)− e2)
≤
√
e1 + sin(2ζ)e2
2
≤
√
e1 + e2
2
,
where in the first inequality the second and third line of (A1) were utilised. In particular, we utilised
the fact that
〈ψ|ZA|ψ〉 = 2|〈0|ψ〉A|2 − 1 = 1− 2|〈1|ψ〉A|2, (A2)
which concludes the proof.
Lemma A3. If (A1) is satisfied and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ] the following is true:∥∥∥(sin(ζ)|1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)XBΠ1B) |φ〉∥∥∥ ≤ √ e2 + cos(ζ)
√
e1
2∥∥∥(cos(ζ)|0〉〈1|A − sin(ζ)XBΠ0B) |φ〉∥∥∥ ≤ √ e2 + sin(ζ)
√
e1
2
,
for e := e1 + e2, and thus∥∥∥∥(XB − sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
|φ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ √2e1 +√ e2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
.
Proof. We address the first line in the lemma as the proof of the second line is essentially the same:∥∥∥(sin(ζ)|1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)XBΠ1B) |φ〉∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥(sin(ζ)|1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)|1〉〈1|AXB + cos(ζ)|1〉〈1|AXB − cos(ζ)XBΠ1B) |φ〉∥∥∥
≤
√
e1 + e2
2
+ cos(ζ)
√
e1
2
,
where the inequality uses the triangle inequality and the results from the previous two lemmata. For
the second part of the proof, we have∥∥∥∥(XB − sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
|φ〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥(XB(Π0B +Π1B)− sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
|φ〉
∥∥∥∥
≤√2e1 +√ e2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
,
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thus completing the proof.
Lemma A4. If (A1) and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ] is satisfied the following is true:∥∥∥∥( sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A −Π0BXB
)
|φ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ √2e1 (1+ 1sin(2ζ)
)
+
√
e
2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
∥∥∥∥(cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A −Π1BXB
)
|φ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ √2e1 (1+ 1sin(2ζ)
)
+
√
e
2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
,
for e := e1 + e2, and thus∥∥∥(|0〉〈0|A − XBΠ1BXB) |φ〉∥∥∥ ≤ √ e12
(
cos(ζ)
sin(ζ)
+ 2
(
1+
1
sin(2ζ)
))
+
√
e
2
(
2
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
.
Proof. We address the first line in the lemma as the proof of the second line is essentially the same:
‖
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A −Π0BXB
)
|φ〉‖ = ‖
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A −
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A + cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
Π0B+(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A + cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
Π0B −Π0BXB
)
|ψ〉‖
≤ ‖
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A −
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A + cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
Π0B
)
|ψ〉‖
+
√
2e1 +
√
e
2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
,
where Lemma A3 was used in the inequality along with the fact that
∥∥Π0B∥∥∞ ≤ 1. We now need to
provide a bound on the remaining norm, which we now do:∥∥∥∥( sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A −
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A + cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|A
)
Π0B
)
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
≤ sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
∥∥∥((|1〉〈0|A) |0〉〈0|A − (|1〉〈0|A)Π0B) |ψ〉∥∥∥+
cos(ζ)
sin(ζ)
∥∥∥((|1〉〈0|A) |0〉〈0|A − (|1〉〈0|A)Π0B) |ψ〉∥∥∥
≤
(
sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
+
cos(ζ)
sin(ζ)
)√
e1
2
=
1
sin(2ζ)
√
2e1,
thus proving the first claim. To prove the final claim we first observe that XBΠ1BXB = XBΠ
1
BΠ
1
BXB
and thus
‖
(
|0〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|AXBΠ
1
B +
cos(ζ)
sin(ζ)
|0〉〈1|AXBΠ1B − XBΠ1BΠ1BXB
)
|ψ〉‖
≤ ‖
(
|0〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|AXBΠ
1
B
)
|ψ〉‖+√2e1 (1+ 1sin(2ζ)
)
+
√
e
2
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
1
cos(ζ)
)
,
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where the inequality utilises the first part of the lemma and the fact that ‖XBΠ1B‖∞ ≤ 1, and we
have that ∥∥∥∥(|0〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|AXBΠ1B
)
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥(|0〉〈0|A + (|0〉〈1|A|1〉〈0|A − |0〉〈1|A|1〉〈0|A)− cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|AXBΠ1B
)
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥((|0〉〈1|A) |1〉〈0|A − cos(ζ)sin(ζ) |0〉〈1|AXBΠ1B
)
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
sin(ζ)
(√
e
2
+ cos(ζ)
√
e1
2
)
,
where we used Lemma A3 and ‖|0〉〈1|A‖∞ ≤ 1 in the last inequality, thus concluding the proof.
Now we have the useful lemmas, we are in a position to prove Theorem A1. To outline
the structure of the proof, we will explicitly construct an isometry ΦB acting on Bob’s system,
which introduces an auxiliary qubit system B′, and then is a unitary acting on B and B′.
Proof of Theorem A1. We first will explicitly construct the isometryΦB that acts upon Bob’s system in
the statement of the theorem. The isometry introduces an auxiliary qubit system B′ in the state |+〉B′ =
1√
2
(|0〉B′ + |1〉B′) and then applies a unitary UBB′ jointly to Bob’s system B and B′. The unitary is
constructed as UBB′ = ΛXBB′(IB ⊗ HB′)ΛZBB′ where ΛPBB′ = |0〉〈0|B′ ⊗ IB + |1〉〈1|B′ ⊗ PB for P ∈ {X, Z}
and HB′ is the Hadamard applied to qubit B′. Since XB and ZB can be shown to be unitaries, one can
show that UBB′ is unitary. We now take the state |ψ〉 and apply ΦBB′ to get
UBB′ |ψ〉|+〉B′ = 12 [|ψ〉|0〉B′ + XB|ψ〉|1〉B′ + ZB|ψ〉|0〉B′ − XBZB|ψ〉|1〉B′ ]
= Π0B|ψ〉|0〉B′ + XBΠ1B|ψ〉|1〉B′ ,
using the fact that ΠxB =
1
2 (IB + (−1)xZB) for x ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, in the first line of the statement of
the theorem, we need to bound
‖ΦB(|ψ〉)− |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖ = ‖Π0B|ψ〉|0〉B′ + XBΠ1B|ψ〉|1〉B′ − |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖, (A3)
and from Lemmata A1 and A3, we have the following useful identity:
‖(Π0B − |0〉〈0|A)|ψ〉|0〉B′ + (XBΠ1B − tan(ζ)|1〉〈0|A)|ψ〉|1〉B′‖ ≤
√
2e1 +
1
cos(ζ)
√
e
2
.
We can use this identity to give the bound on (A3) of
‖(Π0B|0〉B′ + XBΠ1B|1〉B′)|ψ〉 − |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
≤ √2e1 + 1cos(ζ)
√
e
2
+ ‖(|0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + (tan(ζ)|1〉〈0|A)|ψ〉|1〉B′ − |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖,
and by the Schmidt decomposition we also have |ψ〉 = α|0〉A|ψ0〉BE + β|1〉A|ψ1〉BE for α and β being
real positive numbers and |ψ0〉 being orthogonal to |ψ1〉. Utilising this fact we have
|0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + (tan(ζ)|1〉〈0|A)|ψ〉|1〉B′ = α|0〉A|ψ0〉B|0〉B′ + α tan(ζ)|1〉A|ψ0〉B|1〉B′
= (|00〉+ tan(ζ)|11〉)AB′ (α|ψ0〉)
:= |ζ ′〉(α|ψ0〉),
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where 〈ζ ′|ζ〉 = 1 + tan2(ζ) and 〈ζ|ζ ′〉 = 〈ζ ′|ζ〉 = cos(ζ) + sin(ζ) tan(ζ). Therefore, if we set
|anc〉E′ |ψ0〉BE then:
‖(|0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + (tan(ζ)|1〉〈0|A)|ψ〉|1〉B′ − |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
=
√
1+ α2(1+ tan2(ζ))− 2α(cos(ζ) + sin(ζ) tan(ζ))
= 1− α sec(ζ)
≤ 1− sec(ζ)
√
cos2(ζ)− e1
2
= 1−
√
1− e1
2 cos2(ζ)
≤
√
e1√
2 cos(ζ)
,
where in the second line we use the fact that 〈τAZ 〉 = 2〈ψ|(|0〉〈0|A)|ψ〉 − 1 = 2α2 − 1 and thus by
virtue of (A1) being satisfied we have |α2 − cos2(ζ)| ≤ e12 . In principle this allows the system BE to be
isomorphic to the system E′ under the action of this isometry. Putting all of this together we have
‖ΦB(|ψ〉)− |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖ ≤
√
e1
(√
2+
1√
2 cos(ζ)
)
+
1
cos(ζ)
√
e
2
≤ √e1(
√
2+ 1) +
√
e,
where in the final inequality we used the fact that cos(ζ) ≥ 1√
2
for ζ ∈]0, pi4 ], thus concluding the proof
for the first line of Theorem A1.
For the second line of the proof for Theorem A1, thus we need to bound the following expression:
‖ΦB(XB|ψ〉)− |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖ = ‖Π0BXB|ψ〉|0〉B′ + XBΠ1BXB|ψ〉|1〉B′ − τB
′
X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖.
To provide an upper bound to the right-hand-side we have that
‖Π0BXB|ψ〉|0〉B′ + XBΠ1BXB|ψ〉|1〉B′ − τB
′
X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
≤ ‖
(
Π0XB − sin(ζ)cos(ζ) |1〉〈0|A
)
|ψ〉|0〉B′‖+ ‖
(
XBΠ1BXB − |0〉〈0|A
)
|ψ〉|1〉B′‖
+ ‖ sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + |0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|1〉B′ − τB
′
X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
≤ √e1
[
2
√
2
(
1+
1
sin(2ζ)
)
+
cos(ζ)
2 sin(ζ)
]
+
√
e
2
[
3
sin(ζ)
+
2
cos(ζ)
]
+ ‖ sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + |0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|1〉B′ − τB
′
X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖,
where the first inequality is just resulting from the triangle inequality and the second inequality is an
application of Lemma A4. The final term we need to bound is
‖ sin(ζ)
cos(ζ)
|1〉〈0|A|ψ〉|0〉B′ + |0〉〈0|A|ψ〉|1〉B′ − τB
′
X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
= ‖τB′X (α(tan(ζ)|11〉AB′ + |00〉AB′)|ψ0〉B − |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′) ‖
= ‖ [(tan(ζ)|11〉AB′ + |00〉AB′)(α|ψ0〉B)− |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′ ] ‖
≤
√
e1√
2 cos(ζ)
,
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where the first inequality is a consequence of the aforementioned Schmidt decomposition and the
second equality results from the fact that τB
′
X is a unitary, and the final inequality is just the bound
derived earlier for the same norm. Putting all of this together we then get the bound
‖ΦB(⊗XB|ψ〉)− τB′X |ζ〉AB′ |anc〉E′‖
≤ √e1
[
2
√
2
(
1+
1
sin(2ζ)
)
+
cos(ζ)
2 sin(ζ)
+
1√
2 cos(ζ)
]
+
√
e
2
[
3
sin(ζ)
+
2
cos(ζ)
]
≤ √e1
(
2
√
2+ 1+
5
2 sin(ζ)
)
+
√
e
(
3√
2 sin(ζ)
+ 2
)
,
where the last inequality utilised the fact that 1 > cos(ζ) ≥ 1√
2
as outlined earlier.
Corollary A1. For Alice, Bob, and Eve sharing the state |ψ〉 then for Bob making the measurement associated
with the observable XB and for Eve making a dichotomic measurement {Mz, IE − Mz} with Mz being the
POVM associated with Eve’s guess z of Bob’s measurement outcome, then Eve’s maximum probability of
guessing Bob’s outcome is
pguess = max{|ψ〉,Mz ,XB}
∑
z∈{0,1}
1
2
〈ψ|(1+ (−1)zXB)Mz|ψ〉,
and if Alice and Bob’s statistics satisfy the criteria in (A1) and ζ ∈]0, pi4 ], then
pguess ≤ 12 +
√
e1
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζ)
)
+ 3
√
e1 + e2
(
1√
2 sin(ζ)
+ 1
)
.
Proof. Starting with the definition of pguess and ∑z Mz = IE in the statement we have that
pguess =
1
2
+
1
2
max
{|ψ〉,Mz ,XB}
〈ψ|XB ⊗ (M0 −M1)|ψ〉.
Since the statistics of Alice and Bob satisfy (A1) then Theorem A1 implies that there exists an
isometry that (up to some error) maps |ψ〉 to |ζ〉|anc〉 and XB|ψ〉 to τX |ζ〉|anc〉. Isometries do not
change probabilities so we have that
pguess =
1
2
+
1
2
max
{|ψ〉,Mz ,XB}
Φ†B(〈ψ|)⊗ (M0 −M1)ΦB(XB|ψ〉)
≤ 1
2
+
√
e1
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζ)
)
+ 3
√
e1 + e2
(
1√
2 sin(ζ)
+ 1
)
+ 〈ζAB′ |τB
′
X |ζAB′〉 max{|ψ〉,Mz}〈anc|(M0 −M1)|anc〉
≤ 1
2
+
√
e1
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζ)
)
+ 3
√
e1 + e2
(
1√
2 sin(ζ)
+ 1
)
,
where the inequality in the second line is through applying (via the triangle inequality) both of
the self-testing results in Theorem A1 along with the fact that ‖(M0 −M1)‖∞ ≤ 1, and the second
inequality comes from the fact that ‖(M0 −M1)‖∞ ≤ 1 and that 〈ζAB′ |τB′X |ζAB′〉 = 0.
If we consider one round of our particular scheme then (up to local unitaries) Alice and
Bob share the state |ζ〉 = cos(ζ)|00〉 + sin(ζ)|11〉 and Bob makes a measurement from two
possible measurements with observables ZB and XB, where Z = τZ and X is associated with
Cryptography 2019, 3, 27 30 of 34
POVM elements {cos2(ξ)|+〉〈+| + sin2(ξ)|−〉〈−|, cos2(ξ)|−〉〈−| + sin2(ξ)|+〉〈+|} such that Bob’s
observable is X = cos(2ξ)τX . Given this scheme, we have the following correlations:
〈τAZ ⊗ ZB〉 = 1
〈τAX ⊗ XB〉 = sin(2ζ) cos(2ξ)
〈τAZ 〉 = cos(2ζ).
Thus this scheme will pass the statistical criteria in (A1) with e1 = 0 and e2 = 2 sin2(ξ), and a
guessing probability of
pguess ≤ 12 + 3 sin(ξ)
(
1
sin(ζ)
+
√
2
)
.
We will return to this observation later on, but first we need to now consider the case of Bob
making a sequence of measurements. Recall that in our scheme described in Section 4, after each ith
measurement made by Bob, the state shared between Alice and Bob is (after Bob’s post-measurement
unitary corrections)
|ψbi |yi 〉 = Ub
i |yi
A ⊗ IB
(
cos(ζbi |yi )|00〉+ sin(ζbi |yi )|11〉
)
, (A4)
where bi|yi is the bit-string of outcomes of Bob’s sequence of measurements from round 1 to round
i, also Ub
i |yi
A and ζbi |yi depend on the initial state shared by Alice and Bob and Bob’s sequence of
measurement outcomes (and the type of measurement). By convention, we have that b0 is the empty
string. The important thing is that we know in an honest implementation of our scheme what the
values of Ub
i |yi
A and ζbi |yi will be. If we want to certify randomness from the sequence of measurements
we need statistical criteria for Alice and Bob such that if they pass, we are guaranteed randomness.
This statistical criteria will be that in round i + 1 of the sequence of measurements, Alice and Bob’s
statistics need to satisfy:
|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Zbi |yiB 〉 − 1| ≤ ei+11
|〈Ubi |yiA τAX
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
⊗ Xbi |yiB 〉 − sin(2ζbi |yi )| ≤ ei+12
|〈Ubi |yiA τAZ
(
Ub
i |yi
A
)†
〉 − cos(2ζbi |yi )| ≤ ei+11 . (A5)
We can now state a useful corollary of Theorem A1 (and Corollary A1).
Corollary A2. After Bob makes i measurements yielding the outcomes bi|yi, Alice, Bob and Eve share some
quantum state |φbi |yi 〉, then for Bob making the measurement associated with the observable XB and for Eve
making a dichotomic measurement {Mz, IE −Mz} with Mz being the POVM associated with Eve’s guess z of
Bob’s measurement outcome, then Eve’s probability of guessing Bob’s outcome is
pguess = max{|φbi |yi 〉,Mz ,XB}
∑
z∈{0,1}
1
2
〈φbi |yi |(1+ (−1)zXB)Mz|φbi |yi 〉,
and if Alice and Bob’s statistics satisfy the criteria in (A5), then
pguess ≤ 12 +
√
ei+11
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζbi |yi )
)
+ 3
√
ei+11 + e
i+1
2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi |yi )
+ 1
)
.
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Proof. First notice that the statistical criteria in (A5) is equivalent to (A1) up to a local unitary Ub
i |yi
A on
Alice’s system. This local unitary can be simulated by applying the inverse of this operation to Alice’s
part of the state that Alice and Bob share. The self-testing results in Theorem A1 will now hold for
the state Ub
i |yi
A ⊗ IB′ |ζ〉AB′ instead of |ζ〉AB′ since the norms are invariant under the action of unitaries.
Given this, one can apply the result from Corollary A1 to complete the proof.
This result quantifies the randomness of each round of our scheme. Now, if we consider the
scheme in general, there is a sequence of measurements made by Bob, and we want to bound Eve’s
probability to guess the total string b of Bob’s outcomes. The following result gives us a bound on
this probability.
Corollary A3. For Bob making a sequence of measurements yielding the outcome bit-string b, if Alice, Bob,
and Eve share some initial state |ψ〉, Bob’s measurement in round i is associated with observable Xbi |yiB , and Eve
makes a measurement associated with operators {Mz}z, where z is Eve’s guess of Bob’s outcome b, the probability
of guessing it correctly is
pguess = max
{|ψ〉,Mz ,{Xb
i |yi
B }}
∑
b,z
δbz P|ψ〉(z, b|{Xb
i |yi
B }i),
and if for each i, there exist unitaries Ub
i |yi
A and angles ζbi |yi such that the statistical criteria in (A5) is
satisfied, then
pguess ≤
n
∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
√
ei1
(
3
√
2+ 2+
5
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
)
+ 3
√
ei1 + e
i
2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
, (A6)
and if ei1 = 0 for all i, then
pguess ≤
n
∏
i=1
(
1
2
+ 3
√
ei2
(
1√
2 sin(ζbi−1|yi−1)
+ 1
))
. (A7)
Proof. First we can rewrite pguess as
max
{|ψ〉,Mz ,{XiB}}
∑
b1,z
δb1z1 P|ψ〉(b1, z|X1B)∑
b2
δb2z2 P|ψ〉(b2, z|{XiB}i≤2, b1)...∑
bn
δbnzn P|ψ〉(bn, z|{XiB}i≤n, bn−1),
by applying Bayes’ theorem and then the constraints from causality; roughly that outcome bi cannot
be affected by outcome bj if j > i. Using this structure we have that
pguess ≤
n
∏
j=1
 max
{|ψ〉,Mz ,{XiB}}
∑
bj ,z
δ
bj
zj P|ψ〉(bj, z|{XiB}i≤j, bj−1)
 ,
where there are now multiple maximizations, essentially for each summand of pguess. Now notice that
the sum over strings z along with the probability in the summand can be interpreted as a coarse-grained
measurement by Eve. To wit, Eve makes a measurement with outcomes corresponding to each string z,
and for each bj, Eve will produce a guess of this based on the value of zj. For example, if Eve generates
a string z such that zj = 0 then Eve’s guess of bj is 0. This then reduces each maximisation to the
guessing probability for each round, and thus from Corollary A3 we have the statement.
This final corollary gives us the proof of Theorem 1 in the main body of the paper.
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Appendix B. Alternative Quantum Circuit for Sequences of Measurements
The following circuit can be used to implement the sequence of non-projective measurements in
Bob’s device, in which the measurement choices are encoded in quantum states in the computational
basis, as an alternative to the classically controlled version given in the main text. This circuit only
implement Bob’s half of the protocol on his quantum state denoted by ρB, which is prepared for him
by Eve. Alice’s part in the protocol is simply to do state tomography on her steered state so this is
excluded from the circuit. These circuits measure the state for one, and two rounds respectively with a
generalisation to higher rounds straightforward.
|y〉
|0〉 Ry(2θ1) H • H Z(1) Xθ1
|0〉 Ry(2φ1) H • H Z(1) Zφ1
|0〉 × Z
|ψ〉B × X
|y1〉|y2〉
|0〉 Ry(2θ2) H • H Z(2) Xθ2
|0〉 Ry(2θ1) H • H Z(1) Xθ1
|0〉 Ry(2φ2) H • H Z(2) Zφ2
|0〉 Ry(2φ1) H • H Z(1) Zφ1
|0〉 × Z
|0〉 × Z
|ψ〉B × X × X
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